Th e Parliament is formed by deputies and senators, whom take offi ce by universal, equal, direct, secret and freely expressed vote. As Romanian legal system is a semi-presidential one, also as for the President of Romania, he/she takes offi ce by universal, equal, direct, secret and freely expressed vote. Th e election is made by the electorate according to the electoral law.
Th e Constitution expressly establishes that the Parliament is the supreme representative entity of the Romanian people 3 , being elected by the Romanian people, and that the President of Romania represents the Romanian state 4 .
"Th e state is considered a legal entity, distinct not only from the nation, but also from its bodies", and "the head of state and the Parliament are merely the organs of a legal entity incorporating it, but not identifying with it" 5 . Any legal entity has a representative, and in this occurrence the state is represented by its President. Th erefore, we cannot say that the head of state is the state, and we cannot say that the Parliament is the only representative body of the state. "Th e Romanian state represents a form of social organization of the Romanian people, and the President of Romania represents the Romanian state and the Romanian people" 6 .
Moreover, view the taking offi ce procedure -universal, equal, direct, secret and freely express vote -the representative bodies of the Romanian people are the Parliament and the President of Romania and that the fact that the Constitution does not expressly specify this aspect concerning the President, as it is specifi ed concerning the Parliament, cannot off er an argument in sustaining that the institution of the President is disadvantaged by the constitutional provisions from this point of view, but it can determine us to draw attention on the insertion, in the constitutional text, expressly, of the quality of representative entity of the Romanian people that the President of Romania has.
In relation to the representation by the President of the people whom elected him, a subject of debate is the election method, meaning the voting polls.
Th e Romanian Constitution provides, as mean to elect the President, the majority of the voting polls 7 .Th us, it is declared elected as President, the candidate whom acquired, during the fi rst voting poll the majority of the votes of the electors registered on the electoral lists. If no candidate has this majority, a second voting poll is organised, between the fi rst two candidates established in the order of the number of votes obtained in the fi rst poll. Th e candidate obtaining the greatest number of votes is declared elected.
On the basis of a simple mathematical calculus, it could be verifi ed the President's power of representation, both on the fi rst and on the second voting poll. We consider the 9 mln citizens having the right to vote and 4 candidates at the Presidency of Romania (A, B, C, D). If at the fi rst voting poll participate 80 % of citizens having right to vote means that 7,2 mln citizens expressed their vote. Th e outcome of the voting procedure will be: A = 30 % *7,200,000 = 2,160,000 B = 25 % *7,200,000 = 1,800,000 C = 17 % *7,200,000 = 1,224,000 D = 8 % *7,200,000 = 576,000
At the second voting poll, the outcome of the voting procedure will be: A = 53 % * 7,200,000 = 3,816,000 B = 47 % * 7,200,000 = 3,384,000
In this example, the President shall be candidate A, whom was elected by a number of 3,816,000, representing 42,4 % of the voting population. Th us, the elected President shall represent the people in a percentage of little more than 42 % out of the citizens. It may be observed that President's power of representation is mathematically limited, but, still enough from a constitutional perspective.
Th e mathematical power of representation from the second poll is greater than that of the fi rst poll, which may determine us to support the position that the two voting polls must be kept in the President's election procedure 8 .
Nevertheless, this example is an optimistic one, in the sense that it takes into consideration the same voting presence in both polls (and which is greater than 53 %). In a contrary situation, when the voting presence in the second poll would be much smaller than in the fi rst poll, the percentage that would determine the winner would be much smaller and automatically the power of representation of the newly elected President would be less signifi cant, too.
In this case, the election of the President out of the fi rst poll (even if not with 53 % of the votes) would be imperative. Th is is not an argument sustaining the constitutional regulation of a single voting poll for presidential elections, since that a better representation may result out of the second poll, but it may be a starting point for re-implementation of the constitutional provisions of Article 81 paragraphs 2 and 3.
Moreover, we draw attention on the legal aspects related to the organization and deployment of the referendum for the dismissal of the President. By the alteration of Article 10, Law 3/2000 concerning the organization and deployment of the referendum 9 , modifi cation declared constitutional 10 , the possibility was retained of "dismissing the President of Romania by the vote of the majority of the citizens participating in the referendum, regardless of how small this participation may be and regardless of the majority of votes necessary to elect the President in this dignity" 11 .
Besides the express insertion in the constitutional text of the quality of representation entity of the Romanian people held by the President of Romania, it is absolutely imperative that the legislation body do not neglect to respond via constitutional regulation to the following question: "To what extent people's representation is linked to the exercise of presidential function attributions?"
Religious conditioning of the candidate to the function of President of Romania
Once elected by the people and the elections validated by the Constitutional Court, the President of Romania shall take an oath 12 .
Th e legal nature of this oath is identifi ed as a condition to start the President's mandate. As this requirement is expressly provided by Article 82 para 2 of the fundamental text, at its non-fulfi lment may determine the invalidation of President's mandate. Th e same sanction is implied in the case of an elected President whom refuses to take the oath.
Th e text of the oath is also expressly provided by the Constitution, which implies the exactitude with which it must be spoken and the impossibility to derogate from the text. Th us, "I solemnly swear that I will dedicate all my strength and the best of my ability for the spiritual and material welfare of the Romanian people, to abide by the Constitution and laws of the country, to defend democracy, the fundamental rights and freedoms of my fellow-citizens, Romania's sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity. So help me God!".
At a fi rst view, the text is as normal as possible, without exaggerations or limitations. Still, we must notice the religious expression ending the oath "So help me God!". Th is expression opens a new path of analysis, namely: is the person participating in the presidential competition religiously conditioned or not?
Th e Constitution warrants the right to be elected, via its Article 37: "Candidates must have turned, up to or on the election day, at least twenty-three in order to be elected to the Chamber of Deputies or the bodies of local public administration, at least thirty-three in order to be elected to the Senate, and at least thirty-fi ve in order to be elected to the offi ce of President of Romania. " A reference is made in the content of this provision to Article 16 para 3 of the fundamental law: "Access to public, civil, or military positions or dignities may be granted, according to the law, to persons whose citizenship is Romanian and whose domicile is in Romania. Th e Romanian State shall guarantee equal opportunities for men and women to occupy such positions and dignities". By corroborating the two regulations, we hereby notice that the only fundamental requirements a candidate must fulfi l in order to be President of Romania are related to the citizenship, the age and the domicile. It must be added the specifi cations of Article 10, Law No. 370/2004 on the election of the President of Romania 13 which clearly specify the fact that a person whom has already held two presidential mandates may no longer candidate for a third mandate, as well as the provisions of the articles in Section 2, Chapter II of the same act, referring to political candidates.
Th us, if we were to try an answer to the previous question, the Constitution and the legal texts in force make no reference to any kind of religious conditioning of a candidate to the offi ce of President of Romania. Moreover, Article 29 para 1 of the Constitution warrants the freedom of conscience, including the religious beliefs: "Freedom of thought, opinion, and religious beliefs shall not be restricted in any form whatsoever. No one shall be compelled to embrace an opinion or religion contrary to his own convictions. " Maybe this aspect wouldn't have drawn a particular attention if the Article 70 para 1 of the Constitution wouldn't states that the oath taken by the senators and deputies is established via organic law 14 . Moreover, according to the provisions of the Law No. 8/2002 concerning the oath of faith towards the country and its people of the senators and deputies of the Romanian Parliament, represents only a possibility, and not an obligation, and for this, may be replaced with the expression "I solemnly swear on my honour and conscience".
View the quality of President of the country, of senators and deputies as representatives of the Romanian people, the absence from the legislation in force of a religious condition that would limit a person from being a candidate for the of their offi ce on the day the Chamber whose members they are has lawfully met, on condition the election is validated and the oath is taken. Th e form of the oath shall be regulated by an organic law. "
offi ce of President of Romania, as well as all the above, we hereby consider that the regulation comprised by the Constitution concerning the oath of the President of Romania should be reviewed in the sense that the religious expression "So help me God" should be optional.
Prorogatio of President's mandate via organic law
Th e mandate of the President of Romania is of 5 years, it is exerted since the date of the oath and it may be prolonged, via organic law, in case of catastrophe or war 15 .
As stated by Article 63 of the Constitution the mandate of deputies and senators is for a term of offi ce of 4 years, which may be extended de jure in the event of a mobilization, war, siege, or emergency, until such event has ceased to exist.
Th e two institutions, fundamentally regulated, are representative organs of the Romanian people, are elected by the citizens via direct and freely expressed vote. Th us, there are scholars who argue that, per interpretatio, the people should decide the prolongation of the mandates, for the people elected them in offi ce.
Th e fact that the mandate of the President may be prolonged via organic law represents a mean of control exerted by the Parliament over the institution of head of state. Moreover, even if the fundamental law establishes two reasons that might lead to the prolongation of President's mandate, respectively the state of catastrophe and the state of war, it is also the fundamental law that confers deputies and senators the possibility, and not the obligation, to establish the existence of a certain occurrence that might determine the prolongation of President's mandate.
Th e reasons behind the de jure prolongation of senators and deputies mandate are expressly established by the Constitution and refer to the state of mobilization, war, siege or emergency. Th e gravity of the situations determining the prolongation of Parliament member's mandate is nothing superior to the gravity of the two reasons that might precede the prolongation of President's mandate, under Parliament's authorisation. Th e state of war is, in fact, a common cause determining the prolongation of the mandate of the two dignities, with the sole diff erence that the eff ects it produces on these prolongations may vary.
As the constitutional text allows the interpretation, on time of war, Parliament's mandate shall be de jure prolonged, but it may not be the case of President's mandate. Th is depends on how the Parliament chooses to interpret the necessity of President keeping offi ce or, on the contrary, the necessity to organize presidential elections.
Th e state of war is a de facto occurrence, which endangers the safety of the state, and the President of Romania, whom stands as warranty of the national independence, territorial unity and integrity, must remain in offi ce until the de facto situation will allow the organization of presidential elections. In fact, in such a situation, the priority of all public authorities is to get the country out of the war.
At least for the reason of the state of war, the mandate of the President of Romania should be prolonged de jure, and not via organic law.
Whereas the second reason that may lead to the presidential mandate's prolongation is concerned -the state of catastrophe -the scholars highlighted the fact that this notion is not juridical defi ned, which allows every law researcher to assign "catastrophe" to a multitude of signifi cations 16 . To allow a unitary interpretation of this notion with valences that may determine the prolongation of the mandate of the President of Romania, we believe that we must clarify its meaning in a normative act. Th is regulation is imperative in order to limit the discretionary power of the Parliament, on the grounds of Article 83 para 3 of the Constitution, and specifi cally to limit the various possible meanings of the notion of catastrophe.
Th us, it is ensured the respect of the principle ubi lex non distinguit, nec nos distinguere debemus. Th e application of this legal principle to the analysed occurrence is equivalent to the fact that as long as the Constitution does not specify the meaning of the notion of catastrophe, the legislative force will not be able to assign various meanings depending on the de facto situation 17 .
Moreover, it could be a solution for a better administration of the issues generated by special situation of dignitary mandates prolongation, respectively what the speciality literature proposes 18 : the situations determining the prolongation of the mandate of the President of Romania to be the same as those established by the Constitution for the prolongation of Parliamentary mandates. 
Th e dissolution of the Parliament does not mean a more powerful President
Th e Romanian President has a role of arbiter in the political system; however, there are constitutional provisions that lead to interpretations of the powers of the two bodies elected by the people -the President and the Parliament.
As already referred, in the Title III of the Romanian Constitution the mention of Parliament in the fi rst chapter emphasizes the importance of this institution in the Romanian political system, stressing basically its priority compared to other public authorities, including the President of Romania. Th is interpretation is supported by the doctrine, where that "Romania Constituent Assembly devoted to the Parliament, traditional institution in democratic States, the fi rst place among public authorities. Th is settlement of legislative power is the natural result both of a rational arrangement of state institutions whose form of government is a Republic, a representativeness of this authority and the ancient roots of the institution into political and state practice. "
19 .
One of the most important duties of President of Romania in relation with Parliament, with major implications in the political, economic and social life of the country, is to dissolve it. Th e Article 89 of the Constitution provides the possibility that the President dissolves the Parliament and the conditions in which this might happen 20 .
In relation to the possibility conferred by the Constitution in favour of the President, the fundamental law let at President's discretion the attribution to intervene in case the Parliament does not award a vote of confi dence for the formation of the Government 21 . Th us, the gravity of the non-achievement by the Parliament of one of its attributes -to award a vote of confi dence for the formation of the Government -as well as the resolution of the eff ects that this failure could determine -serious governmental crisis -are two appreciations that only the President may make.
Th e expression "may dissolve the Parliament" leads us to believe in the existence of an alternative. But what could the President do in such a case? What legal and institutional resort might the President have in order to solve the issues arisen between the most representative organs of the two powers, the Parliament as legislative force and the Government as executive one? Th ese questions are, surely, rhetorical, view that no other solution is off ered to the President other than, in order to solve the governmental crisis, to interpret the possibility conferred by the fundamental law as an obligation de facto.
If the President decides to intervene, this may only happen in strict compliance with several requirements expressly imposed by the Constitution.
One of this conditions is to consult with the presidents of the two Chambers and with the leaders of the parliamentary groups. Th e Constitution expressly highlights the compulsory feature of this consult, which may not be an option, but it does not make the distinction if the outcome of the consult of mandatory or optional. Furthermore, the text does not specify the reason of the consult, but we may understand that this would be linked to the negotiations between the members of the Parliament for the purpose of reaching an understanding concerning the vote of confi dence -positive or negative -for the formation of the Government. Practically, President's infl uence on the outcome of the consult is diminished, for the consult takes place eff ectively between the presidents of the two Chambers and the leaders of the parliamentary groups. If, following this consult, no solution is found in order to give the vote of confi dence for the formation of the Government, the Parliament will be subsequently dissolved and parliamentary elections will be organized.
Although the Constitution regulates in the fi rst paragraph of Article 89 this specifi c requirement, all other conditions, previous to the consult, must also be fulfi lled: that there be two rejected requests for a vote of confi dence and that 60 days have passed since the fi rst request. Th ese two are preliminary requirements, preceding the dissolution of the Parliament. Th e eff ects of accomplishing these conditions are justifi ed, for they lead to the impossibility to govern the country, so to a serious governmental crisis.
Th e next requirement provided by the Constitution concerns a situation where the Parliament was already dissolved, and, during an entire year, no new dissolution may occur.
[Discussions about constitutional rules on nomination by President of Romania of the candidate for the offi ce of Prime Minister], 12 Dreptul (2008) p. 108-115. Moreover, for situations such as state of mobilization, war, siege or emergency, when Parliament's mandate is de jure prolonged, the dissolution of the Parliament is not possible. If the case were diff erent, the fundamental regulation according to which Parliament's mandate is de jure prolonged shall have no more applicability.
At a fi rst view, the possibility to dissolve the Parliament represent a power of the President versus the other people representation organ. Nevertheless, view that the President assigns a fi rst-minister whom, at his/hers turn, has the attribution to draft the government programme and the list of Government's members, meaning exactly what it needs to do in order to receive Parliament's vote of confi dence, practically Parliament's refusal to award the vote of confi dence is grounded on an inappropriate choice made by the President. By failure to award the vote of confi dence, the quality of the President to assign a competent representative in order to form a Government is questioned.
Th e dissolution of the Parliament does not mean a powerful President and this it could be another constitutional disadvantages in the context of the Romanian semi-presidential system.
Balancing the power between Parliament and the President
In the Romanian legal system, the Regulation of the Parliament, and not the Constitution, establishes the competency in its relationship with the President. Th e Article 63 para 3 of the Constitution provides one of President's attributions in his relations to the Parliament, respectively to convene the Parliament 22 . Th e provision makes no distinction if it is an ordinary or an extraordinary meeting, but, view that the Parliament must meet in 20 days at the most since the elections, it may only be an extraordinary meeting.
Th e paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article 66 of the Constitution state the Parliament convening in an extraordinary meeting: "(2) the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate may also meet in extraordinary sessions, at the request of the President of Romania and (3) each Chamber shall be convened by its president. " When analysing this provision, one may notice the following attributions assigned to the President and to the Parliament: the President demands the Parliament's Chambers be convened, and the presidents of the two Chambers convene the Parliament for an extraordinary meeting.
Th is power of the President may be interpreted as an obligation that must be fulfi lled by the Chambers. Th e fundamental text does not leave this convening in an extraordinary meeting at President's choice, but it expressly provides the obligation of the Chambers to meet upon President's request. Practically, once the President exerts his/hers attribution to request the Chambers to meet in an extraordinary session, their convening by their presidents appears as a compulsory obligation 23 .
Nevertheless, the Article 84 paragraphs 2 and 3 of the Regulations of the Chamber of Deputies establish the conditions that must be fulfi lled for the convening of the Chamber in an extraordinary meeting: the request must be made by the President of Romania, by the Standing Bureau or by at least one third of the number of Deputies; the request to convene an extraordinary session shall be made in writing; the request shall comprise the agenda and the duration of the session; the agenda must be approved by the Chamber.
It could be made a classifi cation of these objective conditions, related to the quality of the person requesting the convening and the form and the content of the request, as well as a subjective condition, meaning the approval of the agenda by the Deputies.
Furthermore, the sanctions are also established, for failure to comply with these conditions, at Article 84 para 4 of the Rules of Procedure of the Chamber of Deputies. Th ese refer to the fact that the President of the Chamber of Deputies shall not take into consideration those requests for the convening of an extraordinary session that do not fulfi l the conditions herein above.
It is not suffi cient that the President of Romania exert the attribution stated by the Constitution at its Article 66 para 2, but the request fi led for the convening of the Chamber of Deputies must fulfi l the conditions of the Chamber established via its Rules of Procedure. Th e objective requirements may be easily met, as we classifi ed them, but the subjective requirement may determine controversies. Th e President has nothing to do with this subjective condition, for it depends on the majority of the Deputies expressing their opinion concerning the agenda.
If the Deputies do not adopt the agenda, as the President requests, the President of the Chamber is forbidden from convening the extraordinary session. Th e same situation applies as for the convening of the Senate in extraordinary session, as it results from the content of Article 81 of the Regulation of the Senate.
In these described situations, is this attribution of the President of Romania an obligation for the Parliament? As expressed by some scholars 24 the two Chambers of the Parliament establish, for themselves, their specifi c competency in their relationship with the President and exist the possibility conferred by the Regulations of the Chambers to reject the agenda proposed by the President in his request which leads to the non-convening of the Chambers in an extraordinary session.
Conclusions
In Romania, a semi-presidential system characterized by an exaltation of the powers of the President of the Republic, there are constitutional provisions which represent a weakness for the President through the political institutions and could also lead to diff erent interpretations.
First of all, the President as popularly elected body does not refl ect fully the will of the nation. Secondly, with its oath is violated the freedom of religion and it is necessary to make changes to the oath because continue to constitute a discrimination against other non-orthodox candidates that could be elected. Moreover, the Romanian legal system is characterized by an independence of the President in its relationship with the Parliament but, on the one hand, it does not mean that the President is more powerful in case of dissolution of the Parliament, and the other, the Parliament it is completely independent in determining its competences in relationship with the offi ce of the Presidency.
